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Abstract 
 
Since the election of the Labour government in 1997 and its vision of the ‘Third Way’, the UK 
government has been keen to support social enterprise and to utilise the third sector in welfare delivery. 
Over the past few years the policy environment in the UK has sought to encourage public sector 
workers to ‘spin-out’ the services that they deliver into social enterprises. The research reported in this 
paper draws on semi-structured interviews with eleven representatives across four local authorities (LA) 
in the UK that are spinning out a public service into a social enterprise. The services being spun out 
operate across four different sectors, which allows the research to identify the common experiences 
and barriers in spinning out. The analysis is underpinned by a theoretical model of public/third sector 
collaboration by Takahashi and Smutny’s (2002), later adapted by Cornforth et al (2013). We present 
an alternative version of this framework based on public sector spin outs. In doing so, the research 
identified that there are significant barriers facing public services that seek to spin-out as social 
enterprises and the challenges that this brings to LAs in relation to managing the process. Issues 
around the sustainability of the ‘business case’ of the spin-outs proved to be the main problem, along 
with the difficulties of maintaining service provision during the transition phase. 
 
Overview 
 
The provision of public services in England has received large amounts of policy attention over the last 
three decades. During this time there have been numerous and far-reaching reforms to public services 
in England, which have resulted in less direct provision of public services by Local Authorities and an 
increased ‘marketisation’ of the public sector (Hall et al., 2012b; Simmons, 2008).  This marketisation of 
public services has been led by a desire to create more cost-efficient services that are also responsive 
to service user’s needs.  This reform is being driven by central government, which is using funding 
reforms and legislation to create greater public choice in the services that they use and the providers 
that they ‘buy’ these services from. In doing so, the government have encouraged the transfer of Local 
Authority staff into new provider and employee-owned mutual organisations (also known as ‘spin-outs’). 
‘Public service mutuals’ have been defined as ‘…organisations which have left the public sector i.e. 
spun out, but continue to deliver public services and in which employee control plays a significant role in 
their operation’ (LeGrand and Mutuals Taskforce, 2012:9).  
 
There remains however, a limited amount of rigorous, academic research into this crucial area of 
government policy. This is particularly true in relation to research that helps to build a theoretical 
understanding of the spin-out process and the factors that drive this. This paper seeks to fill this gap in 
knowledge by utilising prior theoretical research into multi-stakeholder public/third sector partnerships 
and applying it to the spin-out sector. The paper begins with an overview of the spin-out sector in the 
UK in relation to policy drivers, spin-out motivations, service-user engagement and the benefits and the 
barriers and problems that arise from spinning-out. There then follows a discussion of the existing 
theoretical research into collaborative policy formulation and organisational collaboration that seeks to 
outline the applicability of such models to the spin-out sector. The data collected from the four case-
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study local authorities is then discussed in relation to the prior literature and a theoretical model that 
seeks to explain the spin-out process is then presented based upon this data. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
‘Spin-Outs’: A Policy Overview 
 
There has been a significant amount of policy support for the establishment of public sector mutuals 
and social enterprises in recent years. The English government is investing in public service mutuals 
through the £10 million ‘Mutuals Support Programme’, a comprehensive package of advice and support 
for potential mutuals, including a web-portal and helpline entitled the ‘Mutuals Information Service’ 
(MIS) established in December 2011 (Le Grand and Mutuals Taskforce, 2012). This was developed 
following the launch of the Mutuals Pathfinder programme in August 2010, which over the following two 
years led to the establishment of twenty-one pathfinder mutuals (Cabinet Office, 2011). These 
pathfinders covered a range of different service areas and organisational forms and are linked to the 
White Paper ‘Open Public Services’ (Cabinet Office, 2012), which positions mutuals at the heart of 
public service reform. Furthermore, the Localism Act 2011, effective from April 2012, has provided 
opportunities for community groups to take over and run their local services. Under this Act, the 
‘Community Right to Challenge’ gives voluntary or community bodies, charities, parish councils or local 
authority staff the right to express an interest in running Local Authority services (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2012). Such initiatives have provided all public sector workers 
with the rights to take over the running of their service (except in sensitive areas such as defence and 
security), as a way in which to make savings to the public purse and at the same time to improve the 
quality of services (Birchall, 2012). 
 
The health and social care sector has also seen a number of initiatives designed to encourage staff to 
spin-out their services into social enterprises. Policy initiatives in this sector include the ‘Right to 
Request’ and subsequent ‘Right to Provide’ programmes (Department of Health, 2008; 2011a). Right to 
Request was created as part of the ‘Transforming Community Services Programme’ which provided all 
English community health workers the opportunity to ‘spin-out’ their services as a social enterprise 
(Department of Health, 2009). Funding and additional support were made available to support these 
organisations through the Social Enterprise Investment Fund (SEIF), which up until March 2011 had 
invested over £82 million in approximately 450 new and existing social enterprises in health and social 
care (Social Investment Business, 2012). RtR has resulted in at least 38 new social enterprise spin-
outs, with a total of at least 22,000 NHS staff working within them (Miller et al., 2012a). The Right to 
Request scheme was closed in March 2011 but has been replaced by Right to Provide, which extends 
the right to ‘spin-out’ to all English health and social care workers (DH, 2011a). 
 
A number of policies have also been developed to increase the demand for services provided by 
mutuals and social enterprises. This includes reforms to the commissioning of public services. The 
passing of the Social Value Act (SVA) into legislation, which came into effect on January 1
st
 2013, 
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requires commissioners of public services to ‘…consider how the services they commission and 
procure might improve the economic, social and environmental well-being of the area’ (SEUK, 2012:5). 
Whilst there is no one agreed definition of social value, NHS North West defined it as relating to the 
‘additional benefit to the community [non-financial] from a procurement process over and above the 
purchasing of goods, services and outcomes’ (NAVCA, 2013). This policy intervention has been driven 
by a desire on the part of Local Authorities to see concepts such as ‘happiness’, ‘well-being’ and 
‘empowerment’ considered by public sector authorities when commissioning out services (NAVCA, 
2013) and is aligned with current EU procurement initiatives (see below for further information). 
Furthermore, the establishment of the ‘Any Qualified Provider’ policy in 2012 sought to encourage a 
diversity of providers of health and social care services, thereby enabling patients greater choice over 
the care and treatment they receive and the organisations that they receive it from (including public, 
private and third sector providers) (Department of Health, 2011b). Such policies do not however 
prioritise social enterprises or mutuals over other providers and spin outs must compete with other 
public, private and third sector organisations for contracts to deliver services.  
 
Spin Out Triggers and Benefits 
 
Literature suggests that staff motivations for spinning out can be triggered by either choice (‘pull’) or 
necessity (‘push’) (Hall et al., 2012a; Addicott, 2011). Choice or ‘pull’ driven spin-outs are those that are 
opportunity driven and are undertaken to create benefits for the service, its staff or users. They may 
arise through staff innovation and desire to improve service provision. Such spin-outs may be ‘bottom-
up’ led, being initiated relatively low down in the hierarchy by public sector employees (Windrum, 2008). 
On the other hand, motivations to spin-out may be ‘push’ driven, which arise out of a reaction to 
government policy. Research by Hazenberg and Hall (2013) identified that the financial crisis and 
government spending cuts led to Local Authorities being expected to achieve the same outputs (or 
sometimes more), with less finance. Often, spinning out into social enterprises is the only option 
available for staff to retain control and ownership of their services in the face of service dissolution or 
privatisation (Hall et al., 2012a). 
 
The main cited benefits for public sector staff in spinning out revolve around increased staff involvement 
in the decision making processes regarding the design and delivery of services. Evidence on social 
enterprise structures and emerging evidence on spin-outs suggests that by providing staff with 
ownership of their services they are more engaged and committed, which ultimately contributes to 
increased productivity and staff morale, as well as lower staff turnover and sickness levels (Gui, 1991; 
Cabinet Office, 2011; Social Enterprise Coalition, 2011). Furthermore, evidence from social enterprises 
in the health and social care sector (Addicott, 2011; Hall et al., 2012b; Alcock et al., 2012) indicates that 
social enterprises report increased efficiency and less bureaucracy through faster decision making 
processes (i.e. less time is spent on communications with health commissioners). 
 
Research on the impact and outcomes of spin-outs is however very limited, especially in relation to 
service user outcomes. Therefore, little is known about how well spins-outs are performing in 
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comparison to their public sector counterparts.  This evidence gap arises primarily out of the infancy of 
most spin-out ventures, which inevitably means that it is too early to establish clear outcomes and 
impact. The limited research around user outcomes is largely positive, suggesting that spin-outs are 
able to provide high quality, responsive services that are inclusive of all groups within society (Alcock et 
al., 2012; Miller et al., 2012a; LGA, 2012). Furthermore, public sector spin outs may also enable a 
greater engagement of service users in both designing and running services. User engagement may 
include having service users as Board members, or as paid staff or volunteers (Hazenberg and Hall, 
2013; Hall et al., 2012b). Although users have greater representation within spin-outs than most public 
services, there is still however limited evidence to show that user’s views get fully integrated into 
organisational aims and objectives (Simmons, 2008).  
 
The Risks of Spinning Out 
 
Whilst the benefits of spinning out are tangible, a number of risks have also been identified.  These 
include ease of access to finance and business failure. Additionally, spinning out brings with it greater 
accountability and takes away the ‘safety net’ provided by the public sector (Simmons, 2008; Hall et al., 
2013). Hall et al. (2012b) found that many new social enterprises in the health and social care sector 
are not yet in a position to be able to compete with other public, private and third sector providers and 
tender for large public-sector contracts. For spin-outs, this is in part due to the considerable time it takes 
for them to establish themselves (something usually underestimated), which limits their ability to access 
funding and secure service delivery contracts (Hall et al., 2012b; Tribal, 2009; Miller and Millar, 2011). 
Although initiatives such as ‘Any Qualified Provider’ have opened up the public sector for social 
enterprises, these new organisations have to compete with established and substantially-sized private 
sector businesses. New organisations may be superseded by larger and more commercial 
organisations through their economies of scale and their ability to run loss leaders (House of Commons, 
2011: cited in Birchall, 2012). 
 
It is recognised that the spinning out of public services entails significant costs including planning, 
setting up (legal, IT costs etc.) and launching the social enterprise (SEC, 2011). Whilst financial and 
business support has been made available, such as through the Mutuals Support Programme or SEIF, 
such funds are only available for limited periods of time and securing funding is a competitive and often 
lengthy process (Alcock et al., 2012). Indeed, significant amounts of fiscal capital are required to 
underwrite the liabilities that public sector organisations transfer to spin-outs (Burns, 2012). The access 
to such capital is limited to all but the largest organisations and emerging financial markets such as the 
‘social investment market’ do not yet provide the levels of capitalisation required by social enterprises 
and mutuals (Hazenberg et al., 2013). 
 
Low awareness and understanding of social enterprises and mutuals within local government, the NHS 
and in some cases Whitehall is also a potential barrier to spin outs (Burns, 2012). Whilst the education 
of commissioners is ongoing in relation to spin-outs (including links to policy initiatives such as the 
Social Value Act), this is still an area in which more could be done.  
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There are also emerging concerns around the ability of public sector staff to establish and run public 
sector mutuals. Spin-outs require strong leadership from public sector social entrepreneurs (SEL, 
2010), as well as long-term leadership stability (Addicott, 2011).  Spinning out requires public sector 
staff to ‘work in a different way’ (Simmons, 2008), take on new roles and often demonstrate business 
and entrepreneurial skills they did not possess. Recent evidence suggests that public sector workers 
may not have the business and management skills required to set up a social enterprise, survive within 
a competitive market and balance the social, environmental and economic areas of the organisation 
(Hazenberg and Hall, 2013; Burns, 2012; Hall et al., 2012b). There are also ongoing concerns around 
the employment and pension rights of public sector staff in spin-outs and there has been some 
resistance from Trade Unions in this area (Birchall, 2012; TUC, 2011).  
 
The research outlined above therefore suggests that a successful spin-out requires the engagement of 
different stakeholder groups. This includes those within the public service ranging from those ‘at the top’ 
(i.e. senior management and elected officials) to the lowest paid staff within the organisation 
(Hazenberg and Hall, 2013). Additionally, the engagement of service users remains an important (if 
under-used) option in the design of spin-out services and governance structures. The success of 
potential spin-outs therefore seemingly relies on the ability of all of the stakeholders to engage fully in 
the spin-out process. Therefore, in developing a theoretical understanding of the spin-out process we 
draw on literature on multi-stakeholder collaborations within/between the public sector and private-third 
sectors. 
 
Multi-stakeholder Policy Collaborations 
 
Cross-sector collaborations have become an increasingly common arrangement in dealing with social 
and environmental problems over the last few decades (Lober, 1997). Indeed, it can be argued that in 
the UK, cross-sector policy collaborations have dramatically increased since 1997, when the election of 
the then New Labour government led to a focus upon a ‘third-way’ in policy formulation and welfare 
delivery (Haugh and Kitson, 2007). This provides interesting research opportunities around exploring 
theoretical models of collaboration and specifically those that relate to policy initiatives in the public 
sector and the impact of these policies on public service design and delivery. Models of collaboration in 
policy formulation have been developed previously; notably Kingdon (1984) and Gray (1989) both of 
whom explored organisational models in relation to the policy arena. Gray (1989) argued that the 
collaboration arose where there was disagreement about how to solve a problem; where there was 
stakeholder involvement; a problem that was complex; and a perception that previous solutions had not 
worked.  
 
Lober (1997) drew on Gray’s (1989) model to state that in defining public/private policy initiated 
partnerships there are five main factors that lead to multi-stakeholder collaboration. First, there must be 
disagreement amongst stakeholders as to not only potential solutions to a problem but also the problem 
itself (Gray, 1989; Lober, 1997). In relation to spin-outs this could be a disagreement between service 
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users and local authority (LA) staff/policy-makers on a lack of beneficiary engagement in service design 
(i.e. the beneficiaries believe that the poor performance of the service is related to the lack of input that 
they have into the design and implementation of a service). Second, all of the stakeholders involved 
have a vested interest in solving the problem (Lober, 1997). Again and in relation to spin-outs this can 
be envisaged, with the staff and service-users having a clear interest in the service in question. Indeed, 
even elected members (and to a lesser degree senior managers) within LAs have a vested interest as 
they are accountable to the electorate in relation to service delivery. Third, there is a disparity of power 
between stakeholders, which inhibits potential solutions to the problem (Gray, 1989; Lober, 1997). This 
can be identified as being one of the drivers behind spin-outs, with a desire to engage traditionally 
marginalised groups (i.e. public service users) and involve them in the design and governance of public 
service spin-outs being a central aim of policy in this area (Hall et al, 2012b). Fourth, the problem in 
question is complex with no simple solution (Lober 1997, discusses scientific complexity in 
environmental problems, but this could just as easily be applied to social problems). Finally, there is 
some agreement amongst stakeholders that existing methods designed to solve or alleviate the 
problem have not worked (Gray, 1989; Lober, 1997). This is particularly pertinent to the spin-out of 
public services, as it is often this type of perception that leads to staff choosing to spin-out services, as 
they wish to take greater control of a service in order to improve its efficiency (Addicott, 2011; Hall et al., 
2012b; Alcock et al., 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, the model above only provides an internalised outline of the possible factors that can 
lead to public sector collaborations and ignores exogenic factors that can lead to such collaborations. 
Gray (1989) identified external factors as being important in driving collaborative responses to problems 
and identified this as a ‘perceived crisis’ that forces stakeholders together into action. Lober (1997) 
used the example of environmental crises as a catalyst for action (i.e. global warming and the 1997 
international summit in Rio de Janeiro). However, examples within the public sector in the UK can easily 
be identified, for example the review of community-based policy following the 2011 UK riots. In relation 
to the spin-out sector and the UK public sector as a whole the ongoing global recession and the 
spending restrictions that this is placing on national budgets and hence public services can be viewed 
as being a key driver of the decision to spin-out and hence the formation of multi-stakeholder 
collaborations. This provides an example of an exogenic shock that helped act as a ‘push’ driver for 
spin-outs (Hall et al., 2012a; Addicott, 2011). 
 
Lober (1997) developed the theoretical work of Kingdon (1984) and Gray (1989) to produce what he 
termed the ‘collaboration forming model’, in which the ‘collaborative entrepreneur(s)’ move towards a 
multi-stakeholder solution to a problem due to a combination of a common problem, policy initiatives, 
organisation drivers and external  social/economic/political factors. This model is outlined below in 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 – Collaboration Forming Model: 
 
 
 
Taken from Lober (1997). 
 
Lober’s (1997) model was then further developed by Takahashi and Smutny (2002) to include the 
‘collaborative window’. Here the four streams outlined above in Lober’s (1997) model provide a window 
for the entrepreneur(s) to act in, but this window is not infinite and the flux inherent in the four streams 
means that eventually this window closes. Takahashi and Smutny apply this nuanced model to argue 
that rather than collaborative partnerships provided a more efficient method of problem-solving, they are 
instead short-term strategies designed to cope with changing funding structures and policy-landscapes. 
Whilst there is merit in this argument, the rationale overlooks the permanency of some of the changes 
that such partnerships can deliver. For instance, in relation to spin-outs the ‘spinning-out’ of a public 
service into a private company would in practice be difficult to reverse by policy-makers, as in ‘spinning-
out’ government (local or central) loses control over the service in question. Nevertheless, the 
collaborative window provides a valuable addition to the model as it identifies that the four streams 
(problem, policy, organisational and social/economic/political) are in a constant state of flux. 
 
In a UK context the model(s) outlined above has already been applied in exploring collaborative 
partnerships between the public, private and third sectors. Cornforth et al. (2013) utilised the theoretical 
model framework outlined above to explore the governance of inter-organisational collaborations and in 
particular those between the public and third sectors (see Fig. 2). Cornforth et al. (2013) explored the 
validity of Takahashi and Smutny’s (2002) model on a selection of case-study public-third sector 
collaborations in the UK. They identified that the four streams present in Takahashi and Smutny’s 
(2002) model were not independent but in fact interrelated. In particular, changes in the 
social/political/economic stream influenced the other three streams and in particular the organisational 
stream. Exogenic factors within the social/political/economic streams also influenced the duration of the 
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collaborative window, with changes in policy and funding affecting different stakeholder’s commitment 
for the collaboration. Finally, and perhaps the finding most relevant to spin-outs was the impact that 
internal tensions within the collaboration had upon success. Indeed, Cornforth et al. (2013) identified 
that the entrepreneur(s) within collaborations had to balance the tension between efficiency and 
inclusiveness, often altering the governance structure over time in order to account for deficiencies on 
either side.  
 
Figure 2 – The Governance of Public-Third Sector Partnerships: 
 
 
 
 
Taken from Cornforth et al., (2013). 
 
Interestingly, Cornforth et al. (2013) also suggested that the governance of such partnerships affected 
the longevity and effectiveness of public/third sector collaborations and identified research into 
collaborative governance by Provan and Kennis (2008) which stated that there are three types of 
collaborative governance; participant governed, lead-organisation governed; and network governed. 
Participant governed collaborations are inclusively managed with all the stakeholders participating in 
decision-making processes. Lead-organisational governance involves one of the stakeholder 
organisations involved taking a leading role in the decision-making process, particularly in relation to 
mission-critical decisions. Network governed collaborations the governance is undertaken by a separate 
administrative body that was formed by the stakeholder organisations at the beginning of the 
collaboration. However, whilst Provan and Kennis (2008) outlined these ideal types, there is in reality a 
blurring of the boundaries. As Cornforth et al. (2013) state, unequal power relations between 
stakeholders can still be exercised (even in a participant governed collaboration) through hierarchical, 
contractual and market forces. This is particularly pertinent for the spin-out sector, as research has 
shown that many spin-outs are still largely reliant on the funding and contracts that they receive from 
their parent authority (Hall et al., 2013; Hazenberg and Hall, 2013a; Hazenberg, 2013). Such reliance 
on the parent authority (particularly financially) is not helped by the lack of available market support, 
such as from the social finance sector, for spin-out organisations (Hazenberg et al., 2013). 
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Summary 
 
The research outlined above has provided an overview of public service spin-outs in the UK in relation 
to policy, staff motivations, beneficiary involvement and the barriers and problems that can arise in 
successfully spinning-out. The paper has also argued that spin-outs therefore represent collaboration 
between policy-makers, funders (i.e. local authorities), public service staff and the public service-users. 
The prior research discussed in relation to collaborative policy-formulation and organisational 
collaborations and partnerships between public, private and third sector bodies has also sought to 
provide an overview of the factors that shape the longevity, governance and effectiveness of such 
partnerships. We explore the validity of Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model of public-third sector 
partnerships in relation to the spin-out sector in the UK. 
 
Research Aims 
 
The research sought to explore the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1:  What were the barriers/problems encountered by the local authorities 
in exploring the spin-out of their service? 
 
Research Question 2:  Does Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model of public-third sector partnerships 
provide an adequate theoretical overview for the spin-out process? 
 
Methodology 
 
The research was conducted at four Local Authority (LA) case-studies based in England. The data 
collection took place between December 2012 and January 2013. Each of the four case-studies was 
seeking to spin-out one of their services. These services were: communications and public relations; 
library services; adult social care; and youth support and development. In total semi-structured 
interviews were held with eleven participants from across the four LAs outlined above. The participants 
were all senior managers or council officers from the LAs who had been key stakeholders in the 
development of the proposed spin-outs and/or involved in the actual spinning out process (where that 
took place).These interviews sought to elicit participant’s perspectives of the rationale behind the spin-
out process, the barriers and solutions encountered/employed during the spin-out process, the final 
outcome of the spin-out process, the perceived benefits of spinning-out and the policy and funding 
environments that they operated in. Out of the eleven interviews, eight were held in person at the 
relevant LAs and three were held over the telephone. All interview data was recorded on a digital audio 
recording device for transcription and analysis. 
 
The method employed to analyse the participant’s individual semi-structured interviews collected in the 
research was ‘Constant Comparative Method’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). 
Constant Comparative Method (CCM) is an iterative procedure designed for the qualitative analysis of 
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text and is based on ‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Constant Comparative Method has 
been successfully applied in previous studies across a wide range of disciplines from social venture 
creation (Haugh, 2007) to music composition strategies (Seddon & O’Neill, 2003). This method of 
analysis focuses on a process where categories emerge from the data via inductive reasoning rather 
than coding the data according to predetermined categories (Maykut & Morehouse, 1994). Constant 
Comparative Method involves five main stages; Immersion, ‘units of analysis’ are identified; 
Categorisation, ‘categories’ emerge from the ‘units of analysis’; Phenomenological reduction, ‘themes’ 
emerge from the ‘categories’ and are interpreted by the researchers; Triangulation, support  for 
researcher interpretations of ‘themes’ is sought in additional data; Interpretation, overall interpretation of 
findings is conducted in relation to prior research and/or theoretical models (McLeod, 1994). 
 
Results 
 
Analysis of the interviews involved engaging with the five stages of CCM. During ‘immersion’, 76 
discernibly different units of analysis were identified from the data (e.g. ‘spin-out rationale’ and ‘political 
motivations’). During ‘categorisation’, these ‘units of analysis’ were grouped into 18 ‘categories’ and 
from these categories 5 ‘themes’ emerged through a process of ‘phenomenological reduction’. These 
five emergent ‘themes’ were subsequently interpreted as: ‘Social Enterprise Rationale and Benefits’, 
‘The Spin-Out Process’, ‘Stakeholder Engagement’, ‘Barriers and Solutions’ and ‘The Business Case’. 
A diagrammatic illustration of this qualitative analysis process (see Figure 3) is provided for further 
clarification. The numbers displayed in Figure 3 in the ‘categories’ boxes correspond to the relevant 
units of analysis contained in that category. The numbers in the ‘themes’ boxes correspond to the 
relevant category contained in that theme. 
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Figure 3 – Phases of CCM Analysis for the LA Interview Data: 
 
Immersion  Categorisation             Phenomenological 
      Reduction 
 
Units of Analysis    Categories (18)        Themes (5) 
          (76) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A: SE Rationale & 
Benefits 
 
1, 3, 5, 9, 10. 
B: The Spin-Out 
Process 
 
2 
C: Stakeholder 
Engagement 
 
4, 7, 16, 18. 
D: Barriers & 
Solutions 
 
6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 15. 
E: Business Case 
 
14, 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
76 Discernibly 
different ‘Units 
of Analysis’ 
1: Service Options 
 
 
2, 3, 10, 13, 27, 35, 
55. 
2: The Spin-Out 
Process 
 
4, 15, 25, 41, 49, 
56, 59. 
3: Financial Context 
 
 
5, 45. 
4: Sharing 
Experience 
 
6, 44, 51. 
5: Spin-Out 
Rationale 
 
7, 8, 18, 23, 40, 71. 
6: External Support 
 
 
9, 34, 47, 48. 
7: Service Staff 
 
 
11, 32, 46, 60, 72, 
76. 
8: Internal Barriers 
 
12, 24, 31, 33, 38, 
43, 53, 65, 68, 70, 
74. 
9: Policy 
 
 
14, 21, 22, 28. 
10: Benefits 
 
 
16, 61, 73, 75. 
11: Additional 
Resources 
 
 
17, 30. 
12: Financial & 
Legal Barriers 
 
 
19, 20, 29. 
13: Solutions 
 
 
 
26, 62. 
14: Sustainability & 
Scalability 
 
 
36, 63, 67, 69. 
15: External 
Barriers 
 
 
37, 54. 
16: Service User 
Engagement 
 
 
39, 57, 58, 66. 
17: Marketing 
 
 
 
42, 64. 
18: Governance & 
Accountability 
 
 
50, 52. 
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Five overall themes emerged from the analysis of the interview data from the LAs. These themes were 
interpreted as organisational perceptions based upon key actors within the LAs. It is proposed that an 
examination of these themes will reveal the factors that influenced the spin-out process and the benefits 
that spinning-out brought (where this occurred). In the following discussion the participant quotations 
selected represent examples taken from ‘units of analysis’ relating to each relevant theme. 
 
Theme A: Social Enterprise Rationale and Benefits 
 
The main motivations for spinning out were based around the financial crisis and government spending 
cuts and this provided a motivation to explore new models of public service delivery. There was a desire 
however, that if services had to be outsourced then staff in the services should retain control and 
ownership of the service, and so a spin-out into a social enterprise was seen as the best way of 
achieving this. In one case the driver towards exploring a spin-out of a service was that the service and 
the staff were going to be transferred (TUPE) into another organisation anyway. 
 
“About 3 years ago we saw the storm clouds gathering around public spending cuts and being 
none-statutory that made us particularly vulnerable…we were faced with a choice that we could 
either manage over 5 years a 50% reduction of our revenue, or we could spin-out…” (P9) 
 
“We would have been TUPE’d into another organisation...Our service would have shrunk 
considerably...social enterprise was the only option.” (P10) 
 
There were other motivations for exploring the spin-out of services over and above other outsourcing 
options, such as the perceived benefits that it was felt this would bring to the service, staff and 
beneficiaries. It was felt that the spinning-out of services would bring independence around funding, 
marketing, service delivery, employment and culture. 
 
“[The] ability to attract alternative funding…The ability to generate income much more freely, 
seeking contracts from different authorities…and I think just freedom to be more 
entrepreneurial.” (P5) 
 
Finally, the process was often driven by policy contexts at both a local and national level. Locally, this 
was much more dependent upon the support of the senior management team and Council members, as 
without this it was difficult to complete the spin-off process. However, nationally the rhetoric around the 
Big Society, legislation such as the Social Value and Localism Acts, as well as the funding opportunities 
that were available for delivering spin-outs (i.e. Mutual Pathfinders), all had a positive effect on the 
desire to spin-out and the process itself. 
 
“Probably the Big Society was the driving point…I guess that has been the starting point at 
looking at more efficient ways of running the public sector…the driver is financial but however, 
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we now actually believe and we have communicated this to the staff that as well as being 
cheaper it is also more efficient…” (P9) 
 
“We have had cash from the cabinet office mutual pathfinder fund to pay for our solicitor’s fees 
and also the training for business administration.” (P11) 
 
Theme B: The Spin-Out Process 
 
The spin-out process was managed differently across the four LAs. In relation to consulting with the 
staff, ranging from a full staff vote to informal staff consultation. However, all four LAs engaged with the 
staff significantly in relation to exploring the spin-outs viability and its perceived impacts upon services. 
Whilst staff were generally positive about spinning-out there was nervousness around what this would 
mean in relation to employment, pensions, service delivery and social mission. The LA often supported 
the spin-outs through a transfer of assets or through a low-cost lease for assets such as buildings. 
 
“The council was prepared to give out the buildings rent free on a long term basis on the 
condition of maintaining the buildings and providing social, community benefits.” (P1) 
 
“At first it [staff reaction] was mixed…at bit of disbelief, what does this mean? There was a 
reluctance to accept this as…we were a very well-resourced new service. There was a lot of 
denial and then there was a lot of interest around what it means to be employee led and 
democratic…” (P9) 
 
For the two LAs that decided to spin-out their service into a social enterprise, there was a trend of doing 
this over a transitory period (a third LA is currently in the transition phase). Typically, the service would 
be prepared for spin-out through organisational and staffing changes, it would then operate semi-
autonomously for a period of 3-6 months, before becoming fully independent and transferring the staff 
and assets across to the new organisation. 
 
“There was a transition period of three months where the council and [social enterprise staff] 
worked alongside and supported each other so that by the time the [service] staff pulled out, the 
staff and volunteers left felt confident enough and skilled enough to be able to continue and 
develop.” (P4) 
 
Theme C: Stakeholder Engagement 
 
Stakeholder engagement was seen by the participants at all four LAs as fundamentally important 
ensuring a successful spin out. The support internally of staff at all levels ranging from the senior 
management team to service delivery was viewed as paramount. It was seen that such democratic 
decision-making processes helped to ensure staff buy-in. There was however, a need for the service to 
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have a strong leader at the helm that could then harness this engagement and facilitate the overcoming 
of the numerous barriers that are faced in spinning-out. 
 
“You need to ensure you have got that support internally at every single level.” (P10)  
 
“It needs someone really determined running it and leading it...they have got to really believe in 
it. It is bloody hard and you absolutely got to believe in it because you will encounter 
innumerable barriers and show stoppers and you have to be incredibly determined to get 
through all of those.” (P11) 
 
There was also recognition of the limits that internal stakeholder engagement had in developing a spin-
out, mainly due to a perceived lack of skills internally within the service and the LA as a whole. External 
experts were recruited at board-level to ensure that the decision-making structures had the requisite 
levels of expertise. Business training was supplied to staff and advice was sought from other 
organisations and LAs across the country who acted as ‘mentors’. 
 
 “So we are having to build in all sorts of structures to make sure we have got the right business 
skills. We have got a business mentor who is working with us who has followed this path 
before. We are about to have a training course in business administration skills for key staff, 
and thirdly we have recruited to our board of directors people with commercial and business 
skills as non-exec directors.” (P11) 
 
Finally, the consultation of service-users was also seen as a key part of the stakeholder engagement 
process in order to see what services these beneficiaries valued the most, as well hearing their 
suggestions for and fears about the proposed spin-out. This last point was quite pertinent as some of 
the engagement meetings were very heated and unpleasant, but by providing such forums for dissent it 
was felt that a great deal of goodwill and support was secured from the community once the final 
decision to spin-out was made. Indeed, two of the LAs adopted governance structures in which service-
users were elected to the board and involved in the decision-making processes. It was felt that this 
would allow the service to continue to develop into the future and to remain responsive to community 
needs. 
 
“At the first meetings people were angry...couldn’t understand why we were doing 
this……Those consultation meetings were at times quite unpleasant, people were not just 
angry but they were getting quite personal about people within the council……People started to 
come round...” (P4) 
  
“We have had focus groups with service users and we also have two elected service users on 
our programme board...so that their views will be very well heard at the top of the 
organisation…… [Having service users on the board] will be a significant shift in the way 
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service users can input into the shape of the service itself……It shifts the ways services work 
with service users...it makes them more responsive.” (P11) 
 
Theme D: Barriers and Solutions 
 
Perhaps the biggest challenges that the participants articulated were centred upon developing and 
implementing spin-out plans and in engaging  and gaining the support from senior management teams, 
which if not managed well could present insurmountable problems to the spin-out. If the people at the 
top of the LA did not buy-in to the spin-out proposal then it would most likely not happen, and this is 
what occurred at one of the LAs. The development of a very strong business case that provided a 
cost/benefit analysis for the LA was the best way of securing such buy-in. 
 
“There are always barriers because we can’t read minds; we can’t know what our senior 
politicians or senior officers realty wants. So we can spend a lot of time working through options 
only to find that they had never been wanted or favoured. So I suppose there are always 
political barriers in that we don’t always know what we are working with…” (P7) 
 
“My advice would be make sure that you have got  really strong business case that looks at the 
costs and the benefits to the new organisation and your organisation itself…if both sides stack-
up then go for it, I would…” (P7) 
 
Another area that presented a barrier was in relation to expert knowledge (or lack of it) within the LAs, 
mainly in relation to legal and financial matters (EU competition law and TUPE). All of the LAs had to 
seek outside legal and management consultancy expertise in order to proceed with the spin-out, as the 
experience of carrying out such processes was not retained within the LA. This was done through either 
employing consultancy firms, recruiting experts at spin-out board level or through the use of mentors. 
 
I think the big barrier for me that stands out over the last year is actually the understanding and 
ability to work through those European and other legal obligations of any of the options really. It 
was like wading through treacle because nobody really seemed to have an adequate handle on 
what we can and can’t do. We have legal experts but they aren’t experts in this and it strikes 
me that there must be dozens of councils around the country struggling with this.” (P7) 
 
Another key barrier was that the spin-out of services does not occur in a vacuum. The ongoing financial 
crisis and the impact that this is having on government spending and LA budgets meant that often the 
development and implementation of spin-out plans was occurring within turbulent organisational 
structures. Staffing cuts and restructures negatively impacted upon the ability of departments to plan 
ahead, particularly in relation to the proposed spin-out.  
 
“Alongside the [spin out] we [service] were also going through a whole staff service restructure 
to contribute to the savings...so we were looking at possible redundancies. So management 
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were not only trying to steer and develop this new service delivery but trying to steer our own 
staff through this change…we couldn’t have made more fundamental change...but we are now 
in such as strong position……It was about a huge amount of change all happening at once.” 
(P4) 
 
Theme E: Business Case 
 
In developing the business plan for a potential spin-out the participants saw in-depth market research 
as fundamental to the development of a robust business plan. This market research should be focused 
on costings, income, growth projections and most of all the genuine belief that the customers will buy 
the services that you are selling. This allows the LA and the service-delivery staff to build sustainable 
structures that provide the spin-out with the maximum opportunity of future success. It was also felt that 
the spin-out staff had to break free of the shackles that were placed on them in the LA so that they 
thought entrepreneurially and could identify future revenue sources. 
 
“You have to have a business case that stacks up and a service that people want to pay 
for……Some people see it as a survival belt, but that is not the way to look at it. You have got 
to have a strong business case and also the people who are paying for your service currently, a 
commitment that they are going to pay for it in the future. Otherwise you have got no money.” 
(P11) 
 
“So what we have done stepping back is done a lot of research around what is the market out 
there, what is the costs, what is the potential growth, so basically trying to create the framework 
for a full business case or business model…” (P8) 
 
The need for a good marketing strategy and networks with the media whilst going through the transition 
to an independent spin-out was highlighted by one of the participants. Their spin-out transition 
experienced problems caused by false press releases stating that the service in question had closed. 
This was further exacerbated by individual bloggers and a local political party who continue to blog 
negatively about the spin-out service. 
 
“All the press were reporting that [the services] were closed...so I can see why issue and visitor 
figures plummeted……We had to do a lot of publicity, it took quite a while to get the papers...to 
say we were open. There were so many blog sites, that were putting us down…” (P2) 
 
Discussion 
 
Despite the different service areas and outcomes for the spin-out proposals at the four LAs, there were 
common barriers identified across all of the boroughs in relation to the spinning-out of services. The first 
and perhaps most difficult barrier related to stakeholder support. Obtaining the support and 
engagement of all stakeholders was seen as crucial, but in particular the buy-in of senior management 
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teams (SMTs). Indeed, an unsupportive SMT at one LA ultimately led to the decision not to pursue the 
spin-out of services. This offers support to research by Simmons (2008) that highlighted the need to 
keep stakeholders engaged and informed. However, whilst Simmons talked mainly about staff and 
service-users, it would also appear that this applies to SMTs and even elected council members. The 
main way to overcome this as articulated by participants was to ensure regular communication with 
SMTs and to present them with a robust business plan that carried out a cost-benefit analysis of the 
case for spinning-out. These findings also offer support to Cornforth’s (2013) model based upon the 
work of Lober (1997) and Takahashi and Smutny (2002) and suggest that the model provides a robust 
explanation of the process of spinning-out public services. In relation to spin-outs the data suggests that 
organisational factors significantly affect the spin-out process, but that these organisational factors are 
diverse and are dependent upon the differing power relations within the parent authority. 
 
The engagement and support of staff and service-users was also seen as key (although less critical 
before spinning-out than organisational factors). Indeed, all of the LAs viewed this as an important facet 
to securing buy-in to the spin-out process, although only at one LA did this result in a formal staff vote. 
The general trend was for informal consultations with staff and service-users through focus groups and 
meetings that aimed to keep them informed of progress and take on-board their ideas and concerns. 
This was particularly important in relation to staff members who were concerned about the impact that a 
spin-out would have on their employment and pension rights (Birchall, 2012). Whilst the TUC (2011) 
has argued that this presents a major barrier to spin-outs, the participants in this study felt that this was 
easily overcome through a combination of engagement and information with/for staff, as well as the 
acquisition of detailed legal advice around the TUPE process. Again, this offers support to prior 
research which identified that the engagement of staff and service-users was crucial in breaking down 
barriers between staff and management and ensuring that services were tailored to user’s needs (Hall, 
2012b). Nevertheless, the open nature of the decision-making process did lead to tension, particularly 
with service-users who worried that the spin-out process would ultimately lead to service 
decommissioning. Interestingly, whilst service users were engaged in the spin-out decision-making 
process this was not done extensively and their engagement was in a passive role (i.e. explaining how 
the changes would affect them), rather than being one in which they actively participated in the spin-out 
process. Indeed, whilst they were included in the governance structures at two of the spin-outs, it 
remains unclear as to how much input they had to this structure and suggests that service-users may 
only shape spin-out service delivery and governance post spin-out. 
 
Another barrier encountered related to a lack of expert capability and experience within LAs in carrying 
out the spinning-out of services, particularly in relation to financial and legal issues (EU competition law 
and TUPE). The participants discussed the need to engage with external experts such as law firms and 
consultancy firms in order to check on the legality of their proposed plans. The LA legal departments 
(understandably) did not have the requisite experience or skill in this area. Whilst prior research has 
identified a lack of business skills amongst spin-out staff (Hall et al., 2012b), this finding suggests that 
the skills shortage and experience also include wider departments in the LA (i.e. legal, accountancy, 
HR). However, the participants did not view this as a major barrier and as has been previously 
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mentioned, this was overcome through the engagement of consultancy firms, mentors and networking 
with other LAs that had gone through a similar process. This provides additional evidence for the impact 
that the market can have on the spin-out process. For example, the participants perceived that as the 
number of spin-outs (along with private firms with expertise in this area i.e. law firms) increased, then 
the barriers to spinning-out would be reduced. 
 
The LA participants also discussed the impact that general LA restructuring had upon the spin-out 
process, particularly in relation to staffing levels. In the first instance, the decision to spin-out public 
services or at least to explore the option was motivated by proposed LA spending and staffing cuts and 
the threat that these posed to the services in question. One of the proposed spin-outs was driven by the 
fact that their service would be decommissioned if it was not spun-out. This offers support to Addicott’s 
(2012) claim that the motivation behind spin-outs may  merely be a reaction to restructuring processes, 
which also aligns with Takahashi and Smutny’s (2002) theory of the ‘collaborative window’. It also 
suggests that the social/political/economic stream is a crucial element within Cornforth et al.’s (2013) 
model even when applied to the spinning-out of social enterprises. However, even once the decision to 
spin-out had been made, other LA restructuring programmes created barriers for the spin-out 
programmes, as the services in question were undergoing significant staffing cuts (sometimes of 50% 
or greater), whilst at the same time attempting to plan for and implement a social enterprise spin-out. 
This placed the manager(s) of such services under great pressure to quickly identify staff skills that 
needed to be retained for the spin-out, amidst a general restructuring process. This suggests that the 
social/political/economic stream of the model operates beyond the initial phases of spinning-out right 
through until organisational independence from the parent authority has been achieved (and possibly 
beyond this). 
 
The local and national policy contexts were also important in shaping the spin-outs at all four LAs. The 
majority of the LA participants discussed how the national policy context around the increasing use of 
the third-sector in public sector delivery (Haugh and Kitson, 2007; Cabinet Office 2010), the ‘Big 
Society’ policy agenda and the more recent policy drive around public-service spin-outs and 
mutualisation (LeGrand and Mutuals Taskforce, 2012; Cabinet Office, 2012) had provided the initial 
catalyst for exploring the spin-out of individual services. This was supplemented by the need to make 
significant financial and staffing cuts to services, as well as existential threats to non-statutory services. 
The support on offer through schemes such as the ‘Mutuals Pathfinder Programme’ (Cabinet Office, 
2011) were also important in allowing the spin-outs to access external resources such as funding for 
developing the spin-out proposal and implementing the spin-out itself. However, despite this support at 
a national level it was very much the local policy environment that determined the outcome as to 
whether to implement a proposal into a ‘live’ spin-out. Participants at one of the LAs talked about how, 
after work had been carried out to scope the possibility of a spin-out of a particular service, the decision 
was made by the SMT and LA Executive body not to proceed. This identifies that within Cornforth et 
al.’s (2013) model, whilst the policy/solution stream is important in shaping the spin-out process, it can 
be superseded at a local level by organisational factors and tensions. 
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The recognition that staff within the public services at the four LA spin-outs, did not always possess the 
requisite skills with which to deliver a successful spin-out business plan, transition or to run the spun-out 
service sustainably once it had fully separated from the LA was recognised across all four LAs. This 
was not done to disparage the staff, but was rather a process in assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses of the service delivery team, something that was seen as crucial in allowing the service to 
successfully spin-out. The LAs essentially undertook strengths and weaknesses audits of the service 
delivery staff and it was felt that whilst the staff members were extremely capable in actually delivering 
the service, writing bids and working to contracts/performance targets; there was a more limited 
capability in relation to marketing skills, fundraising or in thinking in an unconventional or 
entrepreneurial way. This is understandable given that many of the staff had worked almost exclusively 
and for long periods in a LA environment. Recognition of staff business skills was a key aspect in 
deciding whether to spin-out a service or not, and doubts about the business acumen of the service 
delivery led was one of the reasons why a decision not to spin-out a service was made at one of the 
participant LAs. This finding supports prior research that has suggested that service delivery staff do not 
always possess the requisite business skills required to make a spin-out succeed (Simmons, 2008; Hall 
et al., 2012a). Additionally, it suggests that the service staff’s collective skill-set is crucial in gaining 
support within the organisational sphere to spin-out. 
 
The participants discussed the perceived and actual benefits of spinning-out from the LA. The 
importance of the independence that this would bring to services and their staff in delivering services 
that the users wanted and needed was seen as key. This independence would give the spun-out 
service opportunities to consult with users on service delivery, to seek more diverse funding streams 
and then to target this income flexibly within the service (Sesnan, 2001). It was also perceived that the 
spin-out process would free the service from having to operate within restrictive and bureaucratic LA 
structures (Miller et al., 2012b), albeit restrictions that were often placed on the LA by central 
government edicts. This offers support to prior research in this area (LeGrand and Mutuals Taskforce, 
2012; Hall et al., 2012a), as the participants perceived that this ‘empowerment’ would allow the spun-
out service to be more responsive to user and community needs and innovative in the services that they 
delivered. This finding would suggest that the empowerment and independence of the spin-out moving 
forward could reduce the impact of the organisational and social/political/economic streams, as the 
spin-out gains autonomy and becomes increasingly independent both financially and politically. 
However, this is dependent upon organisational growth, beneficiary engagement and a diversifying of 
contracts and income streams in order to avoid contractual/financial dependence on the parent 
authority (Cornforth et al., 2013). 
 
Organisational Change in the Spin-Out Process 
 
The discussion outlined above provides support for the applicability of Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model 
and Takahashi and Smutny’s (2002) theory of the collaborative window to the spin-out process. The 
interview data suggests that the organisational stream of the collaboration (i.e. the parent authority) 
remains the key arbiter of whether to spin-out, albeit a factor that is mediated by the 
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social/political/economic stream and policy/solution stream. However, the data also suggests that the 
importance of different streams is not merely mediated by the other streams, but that this relative 
importance is in flux and changes over time. As the social problem first occurs, the four streams of 
problem, policy/solution, organisation and social/political/economic interact in what could be termed the 
‘trigger phase’. During this time the ‘collaborative window’ is open to the entrepreneur(s) but the 
decision to spin-out remains one of many competing options being considered by the local authority. 
However, if the entrepreneur(s) decide to pursue the idea of spinning-out their service then they enter 
the catalyst phase. In this second phase they need to engage thoroughly with all of the relevant 
stakeholders, but most importantly with the decision-makers in their parent authority. If the decision to 
spin-out the public service is granted then they enter the spin-out phase in which the initial structure of 
the spin-out is adopted and the transfer of assets, staff and the awarding of contracts are agreed. Here 
still, the organisational stream remains the most important factor although this is somewhat lessened by 
the policy/solution and social/political/economic streams doe to the support that can be offered by 
external partners (i.e. law firms) and central government (i.e. the Mutual Pathfinders programme). Once 
the service has fully spun-out and achieved independence from the parent authority then it enters the 
adapt/change cycle in which a diversifying of income streams, contracts and genuine service-user 
engagement are essential if the spin-out is to become sustainable and grow. Only at this stage does it 
become possible for the spin-out to become independent of the organisational stream. Figure 4 
provides a diagrammatical representation of this process.
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 Figure 4: Organisational Change in the ‘Spin-Out’ of Public Services: 
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Summary 
 
The research reported in this paper sought to explore the common barriers and problems experienced 
by local authorities in exploring the spin-out process. This research was underpinned by prior 
theoretical research into the nature of public and third sector collaborations and in particular Takahashi 
and Smutny’s (2002) theory of the ‘collaborative window’ and Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model of change 
in such partnerships. The findings suggest that Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model is applicable to the 
process of spinning-out a public service. The four streams inherent in this model are all involved in 
shaping the spin-out process and also mediate each other. The research suggests that the 
organisational stream is the most important in the successful spinning-out of a public service and that 
the relative importance of each stream is in flux over time. Crucially, the importance of the 
organisational stream appears to diminish over time as the spin-out moves towards operational and 
financial independence from its parent authority. Therefore, in adapting Cornforth et al.’s (2013) model 
to the spin-out sector it becomes necessary to add time-dependent phases that act to mediate the 
effect of the four streams. Further research is necessary with a larger sample of local authorities 
exploring spin-outs in order to explore the validity of this model. Additionally, longitudinal research that 
followed a spin-out beyond the spinning-out phase would also offer additional evidence for/against the 
model proposed in this paper. 
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